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7.1  Introduction 
The discussion of international policy coordination has so far largely been 
confined to issues relating to the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. 
In this paper I will consider, in the light of  recent developments in financial 
markets, the case for the international coordination of financial policy, that is, 
the  coordination of  regulatory  and supervisory policies governing domestic 
and international  financial transactions,  markets, and institutions.  It is gen- 
erally  recognized  that  the  willingness  of  modem  central  banks  to  avoid 
liquidity  crises in financial markets through the monetizing of  eligible bank 
assets has to go hand in hand with appropriate bank supervisory and regulatory 
policies. Such policies are necessary to reduce the moral hazard facing banks 
with knowledge of  the central bank intervention policy,  that is to reduce the 
ability of banks to assume greater risk in anticipation of  central bank assistance 
in the event depositors are unwilling to continue financing its loan portfolio. 
Since the  market  value of  a failing bank’s  assets  may  not  fully  cover the 
amount of central bank assistance required to avoid a systemic liquidity crises, 
it is possible that, in the absence of an appropriate supervisory and regulatory 
policy, the public sector will assume private sector credit risk. 
Recent developments in financial markets have greatly improved the ability 
of  financial  firms  to  transform  the  type  and  shift  the  location  of  financial 
transactions and balance sheets toward the less regulated activity and juris- 
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dictions, that is, to arbitrage regulatory differences. The redesign of financial 
transactions  and redistribution  of  financial activity has generally induced  fi- 
nancial authorities to liberalize regulatory  constraints in the more stringently 
regulated activities and jurisdictions in order to ensure that financial activity 
will remain within their jurisdiction. We argue that such a noncooperative  or 
competitive approach to financial policy will result in an international super- 
visory and regulatory structure that is on average insufficiently stringent. Under 
such a policy, banks can, therefore, be expected to take on a greater than optimal 
amount of credit and position risks, some of which will be borne by the public 
sector. ' This is not to say that acompetitive approach to the making of regulatory 
policies may not initially produce efficiency gains when starting from a financial 
system encumbered with historical restrictions on the domestic activities and 
on cross-border transactions.  However, a persistent noncooperative  approach 
to financial policy in the face of adaptive financial markets will ultimately result 
in an inefficiently large amount of private credit risk being shifted to the public 
sector through the mechanism of central bank liquidity assistance. 
While the  beneficial  effects on macroeconomic  performance of  a stable 
financial structure with an efficient allocation of credit risk between the private 
and public sector are not always readily apparent and certainly are difficult to 
quantify, it is nevertheless widely believed  that these effects are strong and 
immediate,  as  suggested  in  the  following  statement  by  Alan  Greenspan, 
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board: 
[there are] fundamental interdependencies between the macroeconomy and 
the  financial  markets  that  any  policy  maker-but  especially  one  in  the 
central bank-must  recognize.  For all the new techniques for shifting risk 
around the financial system, the ultimate safety and stability of that system 
depends on the stability  of  the economy on which  it  is  based; and  that 
economy  cannot itself  behave  in  a  stable  and predictable  fashion  if  the 
markets in which claims on saving and capital are allocated are subject to 
waves of concern about key participants.2 
In section 7.2 I review how the restructuring  of financial markets has in- 
creased the ability of financial firms to arbitrage financial policies. A discussion 
of the optimality  of the cooperative approach  to financial policy follows in 
section 7.3, and I offer some conclusions in section 7.4. 
7.2  The Dynamics of Financial Market Restructuring and the Ability 
to Arbitrage Financial Policy 
7.2.1  Financial  Sector Innovation and Regulatory  Arbitrage 
During the past fifteen years domestic and international  financial activity 
denominated in the major currencies has undergone an unprecedented  trans- 
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features in the major countries. Important aspects of these developments have 
been the innovation in financial instruments and techniques; the blurring of the 
segmentation  of  markets,  types  of  firms,  and  instruments;  the growth  of 
off-balance sheet activity by banking firms; disintermediation from domestic 
banking  systems into direct debt and offshore markets; globalization of the 
distribution of financial products and of some financial markets, together with 
an increased foreign presence in domestic markets; and a rapid growth in the 
volume  of  financial  transactions  supporting  a  given  volume  of  the  real 
 transaction^.^ The driving force behind the innovations and the restructuring 
of  private  sector financial  activity  has  been  twofold:  (1)  the  competitive 
response  of  financial intermediaries  to greater opportunities for arbitraging 
regulatory  and fiscal differences across domestic and international jurisdic- 
tions; and (2) the increased ability to exploit liquidity guarantees and implicit 
credit risk guarantees provided by financial a~thorities.~  The greater oppor- 
tunities to arbitrage existing differences in financial policies were created by 
the macroeconomic imbalances since the mid-1970s and by advances in com- 
munications  and transactions  technology. In particular, historically high in- 
flation rates and correspondingly high nominal interest rates highlighted reg- 
ulatory  and  fiscal  cost  differences  between  unevenly  regulated  financial 
activities, instruments, and jurisdictions. A reduction in the cost of data transfer 
and telecommunications reduced the cost of separating financial transactions 
from the underlying real transactions, thus fostering movement to less regulated 
jurisdictions.  Some relaxation in capital controls increased the feasibility of 
moving financial transactions and balance sheets outside the home jurisdiction. 
The increased ability to exploit public sector guarantees occurred with financial 
innovations that facilitated growth in those off-balance sheet activities of bank- 
ing firms that were designed to avoid capital requirements and achieve a higher 
risk-return point. 
In  the  early  1970s, the regulatory  and  fiscal  structures of  the  financial 
markets in the major industrialized countries were quite diverse in: (1) restric- 
tions on yields on financial instruments; (2) regulations defining the permis- 
sible set of activities and instruments for financial intermediaries; and (3) fiscal 
and disclosure rules. For example, in the mid-l970s, interest rate ceilings were 
important constraints in France, Japan, and the United States, but were not 
present  in  the Federal  Republic  of  Germany nor  in  the  United  Kingdom. 
Furthermore, banking firms were and still are prohibited from most securities 
market activities in the United States by the Glass-Steagall statute and in Japan 
by Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law, while German and Swiss 
universal  banks  are  free from such  restrictions.  Some countries had  anti- 
gambling statutes against financial f~tures.~  Differences in the extent to which 
banking and commerce are integrated were also pronounced (see tables 7.1 and 
7.2) across the major economies, as was the extent of integration of financial 
services and banking. Table 7.1  Main Features of  the Evolution of Financial Markets 
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Source: OECD Secretariat. 
Now: 75 refers to  1975, the first year of  the period  studied: and 87 refers to  1987, the most recent year for which information is available. 
“U = universal  banking system, NU  = nonuniversal banking system. 
blssues of  securities as percent of  total domestic credit flows. 
‘N  = nonexistent; W  = exist, but thin; and A  = active. 
dN = nonexistent; M  = minor; and Y  = important. 
‘N  = not allowed or severely restricted; R  = allowed with important restrictions (on branching, ownership. or other); E  = allowed, subject  to reci- 
procity and/or prccautionary requirements. Table 7.2  Predominant Form of Commerce-Banking and Financial Service Integration in the 6-10 Countries 
Financial 
Generally  Services-  Degree of 
Limited  Bank  Integration 
Commercial  Bank  Common  Integration  Expanded  Nonbank  Common  of Banking and 
Ownership  Ownership  Commerce  Commerce-  Bank  Subsidiary  Holding  Securities 
of  Banks  of Commerce  Bank Holding Co.”  Bankingh  Powers‘  of Bankd  Company‘  Services‘ 
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of  New  York. 
”The typical  form of  integration is for a single holding company to have significant ownership interests in both  banks and commerce. 
‘Single  “universal”  banks directly provide all banking and securities services in-house. 
dThe typical  form of  integration is for banks to have wholly owned nonbank financial subsidiaries. 
‘A  single holding company typically  has significant ownership interests in both banks and nonbank financial firms. 
‘Either through  expanded in-house powers or through institutional affiliations. 
gFinancial structure liberalization recently  has increased the integration of  banking and securities services. 
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In an environment of macroeconomic stability, the presence of capital and 
exchange controls, communication costs, as well as differences in legal and 
market conventions had made it costly to arbitrage these regulatory and fiscal 
differences by,  for example, shifting  financial  activities  to the  unregulated 
Euromarkets. It was not until the late 1970s that macroeconomic disturbances, 
technological advances, and the removal of some capital controls combined to 
stimulate financial firms to exploit these differences.  Nominal  interest rates 
reached levels during the early 1980s that had not been experienced in most 
industrial countries since the post-World  War I1 period  and thereby precipi- 
tated  a  disintermediation  from  domestic  banking  systems,  with  deposit 
liabilities subject to interest rate ceilings, to the domestic direct debt markets, 
and  to the Euromarkets.  Bank liabilities  were replaced  with mutual  funds, 
while bank assets were replaced with short-term securitized corporate claims, 
such as domestic commercial  paper  and Euro-commercial  paper.  Disinter- 
mediation  initially  was most important in the U.S. markets during the  late 
1970s, but took hold  in nondollar markets by  the mid-1980s.  An important 
element in the disintermediation from banks to direct security markets has been 
the securitization of claims, and the introduction of asset-backed securities and 
noninvestment grade securities,  which have significantly  widened the credit 
risk  spectrum  (table  7.3).  The  securitization  of  claims  has  also  spread  to 
international lending, where syndicated loans have increasingly been displaced 
by issues of international bonds, note issuance facilities, and Euro-commercial 
paper. 
The  disintermediation  from  the  banking  sectors  led  to the  growth  of 
off-balance sheet bank transactions,  most notably guarantees and short-term 
liquidity  commitments, and  fee-based  activity  rather  than  portfolio invest- 
ment.  An  important  source  of  innovation  has been  the  possibility  of  off- 
balance-sheet financial activity which avoids capital charges. Loan guarantees, 
stand-bys, and letters of credit have become a significant source of revenue for 
banking organizations.6 Perhaps the most outstanding example of a synthetic 
financial off-balance  instrument is the currency  and  interest swap in which 
counterparties  exchange  obligations,  for example,  fix  for floating  interest 
Table 7.3  Issues of Securities in Domestic Credit Flows (as a percentage of 
market credit flows) 
1970-72  1973-75  1976-78  1979-81  1983-85 
United States  40.07  36.10  36.93  32.67  49.57 
Japan  22.83  26.37  37.90  39.00  38.27 
Germany  20.97  23.40  27.37  23.77  36.17 
France  24.33  22.00  21.33  25.30  41.17 
Italy  29.87  26.87  34.60  17.53  50.53 
United Kingdom  17.43  13.63  27.67  28.80  34.80 
Canada  45.07  30.03  34.87  36.83  51.97 
Source: OECD, Financial Statistics, Part 2 (Paris: 1987) 285  International Coordination of  Financial Policy 
payments  or  dollar  for  sterling  payments  (table  7.4).  Banks  have  been 
counterparties in the vast majority of swaps, the volume of which has grown 
from near zero in 1980 to $1 billion in  1988. Similarly, the writing of such 
contingent contracts as interest rate caps has provided banks with a source of 
revenue  that  did not  until  recently  require capital  commitment.’  The side- 
stepping of the traditional balance sheet activities tended to preserve capital 
and lower regulatory compliance cost. It had the effect, however, of removing 
financial  activity  from  the  purview  of  bank  regulators  into  less  regulated 
activities and jurisdictions. 
The  sharp  expansion  of  cross-border  financial  flows  and  the  increased 
variability of nominal exchange rates that had accompanied the abandonment 
of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange  rates led the way toward a rapid 
expansion  of  cross-border  financial  transactions.  The  level  of  activity  in 
international financial markets was further stimulated by sectoral imbalances 
associated with increases in energy and commodity prices and the emergence 
of large fiscal imbalances in most industrialized countries which resulted in 
sharp increases in stocks of  government bonds outstanding. For example, the 
recycling  of  the  current  account  surpluses  of  the  oil-exporting  countries 
associated with the oil price increases of  1973 and  1979 was accomplished 
primarily by banking intermediaries.8 During this period, most of the reserves 
accumulated by oil-exporting countries were initially held as deposits in banks 
in offshore financial  markets and in the major  industrialized countries,  and 
lending  from banks  and  other private  creditors  financed  nearly  half  of  the 
deficits of  the nonoil developing countries. 
The ability of financial institutions to exploit the opportunities presented by 
these macroeconomic conditions was influenced profoundly by innovations in 
telecommunications and data processing.’  New developments in such areas as 
computer technology, computer software, and telecommunications permitted 
more rapid processing and transmission of  information,  completion of trans- 
actions, and less costly confirmation of payments. Such changes enlarged the 
set  of  markets  in  which  financial  institutions  could  provide  intermediary 
services. 
Table 7.4  Outstanding Swap Transactions by  Currencies, December 31, 1987 
Interest Rate Swaps  Currency Swaps 
Currency  Millions of U.S. $  %  Millions of  U.S. $  % 
U.S. dollar  703,154  79.05  98,015  44.72 
Japanese yen  59,988  6.74  37,025  16.89 
Pound sterling  40,142  4.51  6,327  2.89 
Deutsche mark  39,583  4.45  12,281  5.60 
Other  46,662  5.25  65,542  29.90 
Total  889,529  100.00  219,190  100.00 
Source; International Swap Dealers Association,  New York. 286  David Folkerts-Landau 
The gradual  removal of  capital controls in  the  major  economies further 
increased the scope for cross-border regulatory and fiscal arbitrage. An early 
but  significant step toward the liberalization  of  capital  flows came with the 
removal of controls on capital outflows from the United States in 1974. The 
United  Kingdom  liberalized  sterling  cross-border transactions  in  1979 by 
removing exchange controls to prevent capital outflows; their removal, along 
with the lifting of lending restrictions on banks (the so-called corset), opened 
the sterling banking and securities markets to foreign borrowers. The German 
authorities  also have  significantly reduced  restrictions  on capital  inflows in 
the  1980s. Since the early  1980s, Japanese authorities  have  undertaken an 
extensive liberalization  of  cross-border financial activities.  The number of 
foreign institutions allowed to borrow from Japanese banks, or to issue in the 
Japanese securities markets, has gradually been expanded. In addition, the Euroyen 
bond market was opened to foreign corporations in 1984. In the mid-l980s, the 
French authorities undertook an extensive liberalization of cross-border financial 
flows and reopened the Euro-French  franc bond market. In this regard the inte- 
gration of EEC financial markets through the removal of capital controls and the 
liberalization of restrictions on financial activities is one of the more significant 
developments in the recent history of world financial markets. 
The lessening  of  capital controls, the growth  of  international  trade  and 
expansion of  nonfinancial  business  across borders, and the disequilibria  in 
international payments all acted as stimuli for financial institutions to expand 
into foreign markets.  The number  of  foreign banking  firms  in  the  major 
industrial countries increased sharply and accounted for a considerably greater 
share of total bank assets (table 7.5). The introduction  of foreign securities 
firms  into domestic markets also proceeded  at a rapid  pace. Several stock 
exchanges (in Japan and the United Kingdom, for example) expanded their 
membership  in  1986  and  1987 to  include  foreign  firms.  Moreover,  the 
standardization  of  market practices such as bond  ratings, settlement  proce- 
dures, and codes of  conduct have facilitated cross-border transactions. 
While the main incentives to book bank transactions offshore were provided 
initially by domestic interest rate controls and reserve requirements, the growth 
of the Eurodollar bond market, on the other hand, has largely been due to the 
regulatory requirements of  the U.S. Securities Act of  1933 and until recently 
the 30 percent withholding tax on interest payments made on U.S. domestic 
bonds.  In  excess  of  one  third  of  all  U.S.  dollar  bond  issues  are  now 
underwritten  in the Eurodollar market. Similarly,  a cumbersome regulatory 
environment in  the Japanese  yen  bond  market  and  a withholding  tax  on 
domestic bonds stimulated  the  Euro-yen  bond  market. On the other hand, 
German, Swiss, and Dutch authorities insist that bonds denominated in these 
currencies  be syndicated  and underwritten, that is, anchored, domestically. 
However, in order to avoid the German turnover tax, nearly 60 percent of all 
secondary market turnover  in German government bonds occurs in London 
together with about 50 percent of the turnover of corporate foreign deutsche 287  International Coordination of  Financial Policy 
Table 7.5  International Bank  Assets by Nationality of Bank (in billions of dollars) 
December  1984  December  1986  December  1988 
Share of  Share of  Share of 


































































Source: Terrell,  H., R. Dohner,  and  B. Lowrey, The  U.S. and U.K.  Activities  of  Japanese  Banks: 
1980- 1988. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers, 
no. 361 (September  1989). 
Note: Bank assets  include claims of  banking offices on nonlocal  customers  in  foreign  and  domestic 
currencies and claims on local residents in foreign currencies. 
mark  bonds.  Similarly,  about 60 percent  of  the turnover  in  equity-related 
Swiss-franc bond issues takes place in London so as to avoid the turnover tax. 
A significant fraction of trading in equities of domestic European companies 
also takes place in London so as to avoid local turnover taxes, low liquidity, 
and inexperience of local traders. About 25 percent of total turnover in German 
equities takes place in London. Restrictions on short sales and the absence of 
domestic instruments also favor London. About one-third of total turnover in 
French equities takes place in London because of  greater liquidity and lower 
transaction  costs resulting  from a fixed commission schedule for domestic 
trades.  Another  important incentive to issue and trade offshore is that  the 
international clearing systems of Cede1 and Euro-clear are faster and cheaper 
in settling trades than are many domestic clearing systems. 
The prohibition  on the  underwriting  and  distribution  of most  securities 
issues by U.S. and Japanese banks has also acted as a strong incentive for 
banks to shift bond underwriting to London. Some countries, most notably the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  Japan,  had  until  recently  local  legal 
restriction on the use of financial futures. This has led to the use of interest rate 
futures contracts on foreign government securities on the London International 
Financial Futures Exchange and elsewhere. 
The increasing  ease of cross-border transactions, the growing volume of 
outstanding securities, and an increased foreign presence in domestic markets 
all have, contributed to the making of a global market in selected government 
securities. For these  issues,  the  trading  houses pass  their bond book  from 
London to New York to Tokyo to ensure continuous trading. 288  David Folkerts-Landau 
While money center or clearing banks, as suppliers of liquidity or lenders 
of last resort  to nonbanks, are the main pillars supporting the domestic and 
international  financial  systems, it  is the  clearing and  settling  of  payments 
among banks that transmits disturbances from one bank to another thus turning 
local financial disturbances into a systemic financial problem. These consid- 
erations have led financial authorities in the major countries, and particularly 
in the United States, to undertake an extensive program to strengthen payments 
systems. Efforts to reduce  systemic risk through  a reform of the wholesale 
payments  systems  are underway,  most  notably  in  the dollar system. These 
reforms  of  payments  systems  are  aimed  at  preventing  local  operational, 
liquidity,  and  credit  disturbances from disrupting  the wholesale  payments 
system. The reforms have, however,  raised  the  regulatory  cost of  clearing 
payments through  the traditional  domestic clearance systems and led to the 
growth of offshore clearance and settlement systems. '"  Since offshore dollar 
arrangements ultimately must settle in the United States, either through Chips 
or Fedwire,  significant disruptions in the offshore clearance and settlements 
system for foreign exchange and securities due to the failure of a participating 
institution, could well result in systemic liquidity problems in the United States 
and  abroad. Offshore  clearing  of  U.S. dollar payments for subsequent net 
settlement in the United States is thought to obscure and possibly increase the 
level of  systemic  risk  in the U.S. large dollar payments system  and in the 
international  settlements  process.  Finally,  offshore multilateral  netting  ar- 
rangements complicate the allocation of supervisory responsibilities.  Formal- 
ized netting arrangements and offshore payments systems, that is, groupings 
of individual banks with interrelated credit and liquidity risks have shifted risks 
among participants, and it is unclear at what level a supervisor should examine 
credit, liquidity, and operational  risks. Furthermore, while host country  au- 
thorities  of  an  offshore system will  have  an interest  in  supervising  credit, 
liquidity, and operational risks, the home country of the multinational partic- 
ipants in the offshore system will also wish to supervise the offshore system 
to the extent that it affects the solvency and liquidity of home institutions.  In 
addition the central bank responsible for the currency that is being cleared in 
the offshore system will have some supervisory interest in the system. 
A number of broader policy  issues have been raised by  the proposals  for 
different netting arrangements. In particular,  it can be argued that organized 
netting systems are in effect monetary  institutions or a monetary  system. A 
shift away from the use of the central payments system toward the specialized 
netting system  might amount to the decentralization  of  the major monetary 
mechanisms and thus undermine the integrity of key monetary aggregates. In 
essence, a  netting  group can  arrive at  the  same financial position  through 
netting without the large number of payment instructions and accompanying 
money  flows  to  settle  those  instructions  that  would  otherwise  had  been 
required. Thus netting could come to be a very close substitute for the function 
of  money as a medium of exchange. 289  International Coordination of Financial Policy 
The development of multilateral clearing houses could also significantly alter 
the structure of  interbank credit relationships. For example, several large over- 
the-counter markets  such  as the  interbank  foreign-exchange  markets  and  the 
interbank swap market could move to organized exchanges, as is already the case 
with  Eurodollar  futures  markets.  In  each  case,  net  claims  on  the  clearing 
organization would replace gross interbank credit exposure in the deposit markets. 
Under  the  1987 Agreement  on capital  standards,  bank  claims  on organized 
financial exchanges subject to daily margining have a zero-risk weight. 
At  a more fundamental  level, one of  the most important elements  in the 
process of innovations has been the institutionalization of an ‘‘arbitrage men- 
tality.”  For example, most of the prominent banking and investment banking 
firms have established arbitrage products departments with expensive human 
capital and equipment for the very purpose of undertaking regulatory, fiscal, 
and market arbitrage. Thus, the arbitraging of regulatory and fiscal structures 
has come to be viewed as a profit center. 
7.2.2  The Financial Policy Response 
The most important determinant of the financial policy response to financial 
innovations that attempt to arbitrage existing policies has been the desire by 
financial policy authorities to avoid major shifts of financial activity from one 
jurisdiction or market segment to another, either inside a country or to a foreign 
jurisdiction or unregulated market. Regulatory authorities have thus prevented 
a redistribution or loss of regulatory or fiscal control, by liberalizing regulatory 
or fiscal  constraints  in  the  high-cost jurisdictions, that  is, by  leveling  the 
playing field around a lower common denominator. This approach is thus one 
of competition for “regulatory  market share” by the regulators. In particular, 
the  disintermediation  from  banking  markets  to  securities  markets  or  the 
shifting of financial transactions from onshore to offshore locations provided 
incentives for the deregulation of the adversely affected banking sector and 
some other domestic transactions.” This desire to avoid a sharp decline in the 
market share of the banking sector, for example, led to the gradual removal of 
interest rate restrictions on bank liabilities in the United States and Japan. It 
is  likely  that  the  growth  of  competition  from the  securities  industry  for 
traditional banking business will lead to the dismantling of some of the more 
onerous provisions of the Glass-Steagall Statute in the United States or Article 
65  in Japan. The decline  of  U.S. banks  in  importance at the  international 
league table is also likely to bring further pressure on banking regulators to 
amend financial policy toward banking.  l2 
The  response  of  regulatory  agencies  to  structural  changes  in  financial 
markets was strongly influenced by the extent to which the regulatory structure 
and its legislative oversight have been concentrated or specialized. The more 
specialized  the  regulatory  structure,  the  more  competition  there  has  been 
among regulators,  and the faster deregulation has taken place. In the United 
States, the regulatory structure was specialized not only by industries such as 290  David Folkerts-Landau 
securities (Securities and Exchange Commission), banking (Federal Reserve, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency), 
and the futures markets (Commodity Futures Trading Commission), but also 
along geographic lines (federal and state) (tables 7.6 and 7.7). Moreover, the 
federal legislative oversight was lodged with several congressional commit- 
tees. This dispersed system of regulatory agencies and legislative oversight at 
times created incentives for institutions to switch from one regulatory domain 
to  another  and  for regulators  to take  actions  to  maintain  the  competitive 
positions  of  the institutions  they regulated  by reducing  regulatory  costs. In 
contrast, the financial systems of continental Europe tended to have one or two 
main supervisory agencies and a single legislative oversight. In such financial 
systems, financial firms had a more limited ability and incentive to shift their 
regulatory jurisdiction within the country by changing their product line, legal 
form, or domicile. 
Loss of trading activity from the securities markets of some countries, for 
example, France, has  led  to  a  significant restructuring  of  the intermediary 
industry brought about largely by removing fixed commissions schedules in 
Table 7.6  Regulatory Segmentation and Functional Supervision for Banking 
and Securities Activities in the G-10 Countries 
Degree of 
Current or 
Regulatory Segmentation  Planned Use of 
One principal  Two principal 
supervisor  supervisors  Multiple  Functional 


































X  Limited 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of  New York. 
"The Banking Commission, the principal bank supervisor, shares responsibility for supervising 
and for securities activities of  banks with the Stock Exchange Council. 
the universal banking countries, banks are the principal providers of  securities activities,  SO 
that the need to allocate supervisory responsibility has not spurred the development of functional 
supervision as it has in some blended system countries. 291  International Coordination of Financial Policy 
Table 7.7  Consolidated Reporting and Capital Adequacy Requirements of 
Banks and Securities Firms in the G-10 Countries 
Extent of  Presence of Similar 
Consolidation of  Consolidation Requirements for 
Banking and Securities Activities  Banking Activities 



































Source: New York  Federal Reserve Bank 
"In universal banking system countries, banks are the principal providers of  securities services 
bSecurities activities conducted directly in-house by  a bank (in countries  in  which banks  are not the 
principal providers of  securities services), by  a bank's securities subsidiary, or by  an affiliate of a bank 
holding company. 
securities markets and by allowing foreign ownership. A desire to increase the 
efficiency  of  the financial  system to remain competitive  as an international 
financial  center  also  motivated  the  fundamental  restructuring  of  the  U.K. 
financial system. The regulatory framework in Canada is also being restruc- 
tured toward a universal banking system to reflect a growing penetration of 
financial intermediaries into each other's market. In order to bring Euromarket 
activities back into the domestic regulatory  purview,  some authorities have 
established international banking facilities, in particular Japan and the United 
States.  Furthermore, some countries  are changing their  financial  policy  to 
induce offshore activity to return to domestic markets by liberalizing regula- 
tory  and  fiscal  restrictions.  For  example,  the  United  States  has  recently 
permitted bonds to be converted from bearer (Eurobonds) to registered form 
and back after a ninety-day seasoning period, thus linking the Eurobond and 
domestic bond markets more closely.  Similarly, German and Swiss financial 
authorities have tried to have turnover taxes abolished in order to induce trading 
activity to return the domestic market and to prevent further shifts of  activity 
in primary and derivative instrument to London. Such efforts should receive 
new  impetus from the  introduction  of  a German public  sector debt futures 
contract on the London International Financial Futures Exchange. The French 
stock exchange is also being restructured to avoid the further loss of  French 292  David Folkerts-Landau 
equity and based trading to London. Increased competition coming from de 
novo establishment  of  brokerage  firms  by  foreign  firms is undermining  the 
long-standing monopoly of stock brokers over trading in France. A new stock 
market  regulatory  structure  will  safeguard  investor  protection  and  market 
transparency in Paris. 
The effort of the EEC to establish, inter alia, a single financial market relies 
on some harmonization  of  national  financial policies  combined with  home 
country  control over financial policy.  Efforts are underway  to implement  a 
sufficient degree of harmonization to obtain an EEC-wide agreement that will 
allow a financial institution to establish itself anywhere within the EEC and 
remain  under  the  jurisdiction  of  its  home  country.  Once  the  necessary 
harmonization  of  financial policy has been put in place, a bank or securities 
firm  from, say,  Spain would  be  allowed  to  conduct  financial  business  in 
London  while  remaining  entirely  subject to Spanish financial policy.  Since 
banks will be able to choose the jurisdiction under which they want to obtain 
a banking license, countries will have to adapt their regulatory structure to the 
least regulated jurisdiction if they wish to prevent a loss of  financial activity. 
It  should be noted  that  while  concern for longer-term  shifts of  financial 
transactions from one sector to another led to changes in policy by financial 
authorities,  at times the initial policy response was motivated by  attempts to 
avoid banking or liquidity crises. For example, with interest rate ceilings still 
in place in the 1970s, but with banks already relying on liability management, 
a credit tightening made it difficult for banks to refinance their liabilities, thus 
forcing  them  to  sell  off  assets  and  borrow  in  Eurodollar  markets.  Such 
prospects tended to increase the pressure for removal of rate ceilings. 
The  above  examples  of  the  response  of  financial  policy  to  financial 
innovations that are designed to arbitrage regulatory and fiscal cost in various 
markets were chosen to demonstrate that an important policy  objective  has 
been  to  prevent  shifts  of  financial  activities  among  sectors or to  foreign 
locations. The main tool to accomplish this objective has been reform of  the 
existing financial structure by reducing regulatory and fiscal costs to achieve 
a “level playing  field.” 
Deregulation,  in  turn,  has  created  incentives for  further arbitrage  and 
innovations. For example, the scope for regulatory arbitrage between domestic 
and offshore markets has also been extended by the gradual removal of capital 
controls and the increased  financial flows associated  with recent  large-scale 
current  account imbalances.  l3 Furthermore,  a  greater presence  of  foreign 
financial  intermediaries  in  domestic  markets has  served  as  a  conduit  for 
innovations and created competitive pressures. 
7.2.3  The Role of Public Sector Guarantees 
The changes in financial systems-innovations  cum deregulation-discussed 
above have allowed financial firms, in particular banks, to shift activities to less 
regulated  instruments  or jurisdiction.  Deregulation  has  greatly  increased  the 293  International Coordination of  Financial Policy 
access of  intermediaries to financial instruments subject to greater market and 
liquidity risk. It has also increased competitiveness in financial systems through 
the removal of market segmentation, an increased reliance on market-determined 
interest rates, and an increased foreign presence. Such a new environment has 
produced a number of  financial crises,  which  gradually have sharpened and 
extended the role of public sector guarantees of the financial system. If the ability 
by financial firms to assume greater risk had been met with a credible reduction 
of central bank support, then financial firms would have been disciplined by the 
markets  away  from  assuming  more  risk.  However,  public  sector  liquidity 
guarantees and implicit solvency guarantees have increased in many instances 
over the past fifteen years. For example, the default of the Penn Central in 1970 
on its commercial paper led to support measures by the Federal Reserve in the 
commercial paper market. In the spring of  1974, the 20th largest U.S. bank, the 
Franklin National, nearly failed, rendering it impossible for all but the ten larg- 
est banks to roll over their maturing CDs. This development was compounded 
by  the use of  short-term borrowings to finance real estate affiliates (REIT) of 
banks,  which led to difficulties when an unexpected rise in interest rates oc- 
curred. Again intervention  by the Federal Reserve avoided a major liquidity crisis. 
The failure of the Continental Illinois bank led to one of the most  sweeping 
interventions by financial authorities, which, before it was over, established the 
policy that some banks are too-lurge-to-fail.  Thus, such rescue operations gen- 
erally defined a new more generous intervention policy of the financial author- 
ities. 
The extended role of financial authorities is being further defined by  the 
LDC debt crisis, the U.S. savings and loan crisis, and the action during the 
October 1987 stock market adjustment. With regard to the LDC debt crisis, 
I have argued elsewhereI4 that the growth in bank lending to LDCs during the 
period 1973-82  was, in part, due to the de facto insurance of all bank deposit 
liabilities which makes it optimal for bank lenders to pursue high-risk lending 
opportunities. The U.S. savings and loan (S&L) crisis is an example of how 
deregulation  of  restrictions on the  choice of  assets,  without  curtailing  the 
implicit or explicit cover of bank liabilities, is an inducement for banks near 
default to pursue  a double-or-nothing strategy by  undertaking  a high-risk, 
high-return strategy. The contingent liability of the insurance fund has been 
estimated currently at $250 billion. The ongoing S&L rescue operation in the 
United States appears to be guided by two factors. The first is to protect and 
preserve  the insurance fund  and the  second is  to protect  and preserve the 
existing  banking  structure.  Since  the  contingent  claims  far exceed  the 
resources  of  the insurance fund, this policy  effectively has  committed the 
general resources of the federal government to secure deposit liabilities. The 
Continental Illinois rescue operation established that even depositors who are 
well outside of the statutory insurance limits, such as large foreign depositors, 
are de facto insured. In the case of Continental Illinois, only about $3.5 billion 
of deposits were insured. Evidence that a “too-big-to-fail’’  philosophy guides 294  David Folkerts-Landau 
public sector support of banking can be found in testimony by FDIC Chairman 
William Seidman given in 1987 before the Senate Banking Committee 
Our experience to date in resolving several large failing bank cases suggests 
that  the  costs  and  dislocation  of  failing  to  fully  protect  certain  bank 
depositors  and creditors appear unacceptable.  . . . Certainly the greatest 
threat to the sufficiency and viability of the deposit insurance fund is posed 
by the largest banks that might be considered “too-large-to-fail.” 
The result has been that the FDIC has given blanket assurances to the de- 
positors and creditors in the three larger rescue cases it faced recently (Con- 
tinental Illinois, First City, First  Republic). An interpretation  of  the recent 
rescue actions by the FDIC as lender-of-last-resort activities is not appropriate 
since it consisted of lending on bad assets in support of an individual firm 
rather than in support of other banks that might be affected by the default, thus 
contradicting the Bagehot tenets. The possibilities of supporting the banks that 
are affected by a bank failure, instead of supporting the failed bank, by limiting 
deposit insurance  to its  statutory  limit,  was raised  in Chairman Seidman’s 
testimony in 1987 but was dismissed as impractical. Thus, it appears that the 
financial policy regarding failing banks is one of full support as long as the 
bank is too-big-to-fail. The extension of public sector support during the recent 
period of  financial market restructuring  seems to have been less obvious in 
countries other than the United States. But the perception  that the financial 
authorities  in these countries have similar views  concerning too-big-to-fail 
firms is widespread. 
7.3  The Argument for a Convergence and Cooperation of 
Financial Policy 
In this section I first discuss the basic financial policy paradigm. Then 1 show 
that  the  dynamics  of  financial  market  restructuring  as described  above- 
arbitrage-driven innovations met with deregulation and increased guarantees 
by financial authorities-imply  that a cooperative approach to the formulation 
and  execution  of  financial policy  dominates the  competitive approach de- 
scribed above. 
We  take  from  the  available  evidence  that  unregulated  banking  systems 
without  central  bank  liquidity  support  will  be  subject to periodic  liquidity 
crises caused by a fundamental instability of the fractional reserve banking 
system. The ability to create currency through the open market purchase of 
securities or direct lending against eligible collateral has allowed central banks 
to guarantee the exchange rate between bank deposits and currency. In fact, 
during the period from  1793 to  1933 the United States experienced  at least 
seventeen banking crises, while none have occurred since 1933, the beginning 
of active Federal Reserve intervention. l6 Thus the systemic financial instability 
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the  central  bank  clearing  house,  where  banks  would  hold  their  clearing 
balances,  and  which  stood  ready  to  convert  bank  deposit  liabilities  into 
currency,  taking  bank  assets  as  collateral.  However,  in  the  absence  of 
regulatory and supervisory restraints on the activities of banks, it is easy to see 
that, under a broad class of assumptions about the stochastic properties of the 
occurrence of liquidity  crises, the central bank  should expect to experience 
losses on the bank assets acquired in the course of providing liquidity. This is 
the case when  the market value of the collateral is less than the amount of 
central bank assistance deemed necessary to prevent the failure of a bank from 
creating  a  systemic  liquidity  problem.  While the  monetary  effects  of  the 
liquidity operation can be sterilized, the central bank’s losses on acquired bank 
assets falls to the taxpayers. The public sector, therefore, assumes some of the 
credit risk of  bank assets in return for an efficient banking system. Thus, as 
has occurred at various stages in the evolution of the payments and banking 
system, a certain amount of credit risk has been accepted, in this case by the 
central  bank,  as  the  cost of  providing  an  efficient  payment  system. The 
taxpayer  has  assumed  the  credit  risk  inherent  in  bank  assets  that  serve as 
collateral for central bank lending in return for an efficient payment system. 
In  order to  reduce  the  credit  risk  incurred  during  liquidity  operations, 
monetary authorities impose a regulatory and supervisory regime on financial 
systems (not only on banking systems) designed to reduce the expected losses 
on acquired bank assets to a desired level. Such a regulatory and supervisory 
regime  typically  involves  the  setting  of  capital  requirements  and  position 
limits, as well as assesses the solvency of the bank through supervision and 
inspection of the bank’s assets. However, the more restrictive the regulatory 
and supervisory regimes, the less efficient the financial system is in pricing 
savings and risk. Hence there exists a trade-off  between the amount of credit 
risk assumed by the public sector and the efficiency of  the financial system. 
Casual  observation  suggests  that  there  exist  significant  differences  in  the 
willingness of the public sector in various countries to assume the credit risk 
of bank assets. For example, recent history suggests that the United States is 
willing to tolerate a significant amount of credit risk in the interest of a liberal 
financial system, whereas financial authorities in Germany appear willing to 
accept a less liberal  financial  system  (e.g., the  absence  of  well developed 
short-term money markets) in the interest of a lower credit risk for the public 
sector. 
Two questions emerge from this approach: 
(1) What is the nature of the trade-off between the amount of credit risk 
assumed  by  the  public  sector  and  the  various  regulatory  and  supervisory 
policies,  given  that  the  intervention  policy  of  the  central  bank  is  fully 
anticipated? Do there exist stable equilibria? 
(2) What is the efficient set of equilibria, that is, is it possible to identify 
supervisory and regulatory systems that have a least effect on the efficiency of 
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In order to address these two questions, it is necessary to reexamine the role 
of  the banking and payments  system within  modern  financial systems. We 
argue  that,  in  financial  systems  with  well-developed  capital  and  money 
markets, the main function of the large money center or clearing banks is the 
supply of liquidity to nonbanks, a function that is made possible through their 
access to central bank liquidity facilities. This specialization is shown to be a 
natural outgrowth of the banks’ involvement in the payment system. We argue 
as well that wholesale payments systems transmit disturbances from one bank 
to another, thus turning local financial disturbances into systemic problems. 
The interbank lending which arose out of the clearance of  payments meant 
that large banks offered lines of credit to their correspondent  banks and that 
such banks  had  to  specialize in  monitoring  and  managing  interbank  credit 
which frequently arose in the clearing process on short notice and without the 
safety of collateral. The need to develop the skill to evaluate continually the 
creditworthiness of correspondent banks led banks to specialize in a short-term 
liquidity-type of lending in support of providing efficient payment services to 
their depositors.  Economies of scale then led clearing banks or money center 
banks to extend this expertise and become suppliers of liquidity to the nonbank 
sector. Such banks will, for example, extend lines of credit against a fee to 
issuers of short-term securitized debt instruments to ensure the holders that the 
security will be redeemed  even in times of  financial market disturbance. In 
addition,  such  banks  will  lend  on  short notice  large  amounts to  finance 
securities dealers’ inventory, provide funds for margin calls, and satisfy other 
needs for liquidity. The important point is that a group of  large international 
banks, that is, money center or clearing banks, developed by specializing in 
the  supply  of  liquidity  necessary  for  the  efficient  operation  of  payments 
systems. This was clearly recognized, for example, by Corrigan (1986): 
The efficient  working  of  a  large  modem economy  clearly  requires  the 
presence of a stock of  financial assets which are highly liquid and readily 
transferable,  thereby facilitating the broad range of transactions needed to 
sustain the real and financial sectors of the economy. To be highly liquid, 
such assets must be available to the carrier at very short notice (a day or less) 
at par. To be readily transferable, ownership rights in such assets must be 
capable of  being readily shifted to other economic agents, also at par and 
in a form in which they are acceptable by  that other party. 
The large clearing or money center banks have developed in response to this 
need  for liquidity and have come to satisfy this need through  the supply of 
liquid transaction balances either directly or indirectly through lines of  credit. 
An examination of  the balance sheets of large money center or clearing banks 
tends to support the view that the provision of  liquidity is their major function. 
Other lending activity tends to be highly collateralized  or actuarially priced. 
The narrow view of the role of money center or clearing banks allows stronger 
statements about the losses in efficiency due to regulatory restraints on banking 
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term lending, then restrictions on their risk taking in this area are unlikely to 
reduce the efficiency of the financial intermediary system. On the other hand, 
restrictions on the ability of banks to provide liquidity to nonbanks would tend 
to reduce  the  efficiency  of  the financial  sector.  Thus the  optimal type  of 
financial  regulation  would  seek  to  ensure an efficient  pricing  of  liquidity 
supplied by banks. 
Central bank liquidity assistance is optimal only as long as it is designed to 
avoid the externalities  of  the failure of  a single or a few institutions.  Such 
assistance should be designed to reduce systemic risk, that is, the risk that the 
failure of a single institution will cause a system-wide liquidity crisis. These 
considerations  point  toward  the  supervisory  and  regulatory  policy  that 
strengthens  the  ability  of  payment systems to  withstand  local  operational, 
liquidity, and credit disturbances as reducing public sector credit risk without 
reducing efficiency. A consequence of the rapid growth of international trading 
in  goods,  services, and  financial  transactions  and  of  the  globalization  of 
markets  in  twenty-four-hour  trading  is  that  the  demand  for  international 
payment  services  is  increasing  rapidly.  The  international  circulation  of 
financial assets  has created  foreign  markets  for domestic assets, and large 
correspondent  banks  handle  payments  in currencies different  from those of 
their  countries  of  origin.  Hence,  netting  schemes or  international  netting 
arrangements have been  developed. This development has raised questions 
about whether market forces can produce an efficient and sound international 
payments system. Current initiatives have been undertaken so far by individual 
banks or small groups of banks, but in the presence of externalities, central 
bank cooperation  might produce benefits.  Systemic risk  in netting  arrange- 
ments ultimately derives from the credit extended in interbank settlement in the 
course of the settlement period. Many of these developments are inevitable due 
to the growth  of  a multicurrency  reserve system in which  various currency 
areas become overlapping. With the decline of the importance of the dollar, 
it is likely that in the future there will be no system that serves to anchor the 
one leading currency to the monetary bank supervision as lender-of-last-resort 
authority  upon  which  that  monetary  and payment  system are based.  Thus 
clearing and settlement of  foreign currency transactions have a supernational 
character. A third and new area of  international central bank cooperation will 
have  to be  explored in  addition  to the area  of  monetary  policy  and  bank 
supervision.  The need for a collective involvement of national central banks 
in the functioning of the international payment system is brought into focus by 
the growth of private international netting schemes. The need expressed by the 
market for multilateral clearing houses for international transactions. Private 
cooperative arrangements without  central bank  involvement are unlikely  to 
reduce systemic  risk to acceptable levels, particularly the power to impose 
restrictions as well as provide liquidity occasionally required by members at 
closing  time.  The optimum solution  among those  that  can realistically  be 
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public sectors with a clear definition of rules and a strict definition of the scope 
of central bank activity. 
It is easy to see that when financial innovation by financial firms is met by 
attempts of financial authorities to prevent shifts of financial activities across 
jurisdictions  or to  unregulated  sectors, while  at  the  same time  extending 
financial  guarantees, then  the system  can  be  expected  to experience more 
financial crises, as financial firms are subject to more risk, and the authorities 
will be subject to a greater contingent liability. Thus, such a financial system, 
with a financial policy which we call competitive, may experience a greater 
than optimal number of crises, and may misallocate  and misprice risk. 
In order to narrow the scope for arbitrage, a cooperative approach  to the 
formulation of  financial  policy  among the  main  financial authorities  would 
involve convergence of regulatory and fiscal features, as well as a convergence 
of  central  bank  policy  on  liquidity  guarantees.  Such  cooperation  could 
generally be credibly entered into as it would involve a large number of  rules 
which could not be abrogated easily, rather than the coordination of  only one 
or two highly visible policy  instruments. 
7.4  Conclusion 
The main conclusion of this paper is that the outcome of this uncoordinated 
restructuring  process  in  financial markets-driven  by  regulatory  and  fiscal 
arbitrage  by  financial  intermediaries  and  combined  with  competition  for 
market  share by  financial  authorities-can  be  inefficient  and  unstable  and 
results in an inefficiently large amount of  private credit risk being shifted to 
the public sector.  While innovations cum deregulation have greatly extended 
the  scope for intermediaries  to assume  risk  in  the  form of  interest  rate, 
currency, credit, market, and liquidity risk, this process has not been met by 
a greater cost to assume more risk. Such an increase in cost could have been 
brought  about  by  a reduction  in  implicit  or explicit  liquidity  and  solvency 
guarantees  extended to intermediaries  by financial authorities.  Instead,  in 
some notable instances such guarantees were significantly extended, thereby 
creating an even stronger incentive for banking intermediaries to assume more 
risk. l9 Hence the prevailing process of restructuring financial activities has led 
to perverse incentives regarding risk taking by financial intermediaries. 
A corollary of the above argument is that competition for financial activity 
by  financial  authorities  has  not  produced  an  optimal  level  of  prudential 
regulation  nor  an  optimal pricing  and allocation  of  risk.  As  a  result, the 
financial sector has been and may continue to be a source of  instability. The 
U.S. S&L crisis, together with the failure of  some individual banks, such as 
Continental  Illinois,  are  the  most  visible  examples.  In  addition,  it can  be 
argued,  perhaps  less  obviously,  that  excessive  risk  taking  in  lending  to 
developing  countries,  as  well  as  the  more  recent  financing  of  leveraged 
buy-outs is a direct consequence of the incentives for banking firms to leverage 
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A successful coordination of financial policy across jurisdictions can avoid 
creating  incentives  for  intermediaries  to  assume  excessive  risk  and  can 
facilitate  a desired  level  of  prudential  regulation.  Through coordination  of 
financial policy,  it would be possible  to arrive at a desired level of  risk and 
financial guarantees. In this regard, the recently concluded Basle Agreement 
on risk-weighted  capital  standards  for international  banks is an outstanding 
example of  a cooperative solution to  a problem  that  had been created by  a 
competitive approach to bank regulation.21  Similarly, in recently inaugurated 
efforts to reduce payment system risk, U.S.  authorities have tended to look for 
an international cooperative approach. 
In order to proceed much further with the analysis and determine specific 
areas in which  a convergence of policy  would be most beneficial,  it is first 
necessary to identify a desired structure of the financial system. In this regard, 
the hypothesis that large money center banks, that is, banks that are too large 
to fail, tend to have a comparative advantage in  supplying  liquidity  to  the 
financial system would  suggest  concentrating regulatory  measures  on risky 
activities  not  related  to  the  liquidity  supply  function.  Second,  since  the 
wholesale  payments  system  transmits  disturbances from one bank  to other 
financial institutions the design of such systems and the control of  risk here 
would tend to improve the trade-off between efficiency loss and the amount 
of  credit risk assumed by the public sector. 
An important problem in implementing a cooperative financial policy is the 
treatment of  financial activity in jurisdictions  that are not party to cooperative 
agreements when such activity is undertaken by affiliates of firms in jurisdictions 
that are party to cooperative agreements. One possible approach could be the strict 
exclusion of such affiliates from the guarantee cover and the timely and rigorous 
valuation, by supervisors, of the parents' claims on the affiliate. The task facing 
supervisors in  valuing such claims would,  in  principle,  appear to be no more 
difficult than that of  valuing bank claims on domestic commercial firms. 
The main implementation of the conclusions reached in this paper can be found 
in  the Basle Agreement  of the G-10 on the convergence  of  risk-based capital 
standards for international banks. In particular, the agreement-encompassing  the 
definition of capital and risk weights for credit risk and some interest rate risk-was 
reached in direct response to the problems associated with a competitive financial 
policy. Some firms, most notably Japanese banks, already appear to have been 
forced to adjust their pricing in off-balance sheet activities, which according to the 
agreement require capital cover. There is much less progress in cooperating on the 
convergence of financial policy in securities markets. 
In addition to the  1987 Bade Agreement  on capital standards, agreement 
had  been  reached  earlier,  under the  auspices  of  the  Bank  for International 
Settlements, on consolidated capital supervision and allocation of supervisory 
responsibilities  between  parent  and  host  country  supervisors.  By  1987, 
consolidated  supervision  of  foreign  branches,  as  well  as  majority-owned 
subsidiaries for capital adequacy purposes, had  been established  among the 
G-5 and Switzerland  (see table 7.7). 300  David Folkerts-Landau 
Table 7.8  CapitaVAsset Ratios of Banks in Selected Industrial Countries, 1979- 1988 
(in percent) 

























































































































































Sources: Data provided by  official sources and Fund staff estimates. 
Note: Aggregate  figures  such as the  ones in  this  table  must  be  interpreted  with  caution, owing  to 
differences across national groups of banks and over time in the accounting of bank assets and capital. 
In  particular,  provisioning  practices vary  considerably  across these countries as do the definitions of 
capital.  Therefore, cross-country  comparisons  may be  less appropriate  than  developments  over time 
within a single country. 
"Ration  of  equity  plus  accumulated  appropriations  for  contingencies  (before  198  1,  accumulated 
appropriations for losses) to total assets (Bank of  Canada Review). 
bThe changeover to consolidated reporting from November I, 1981, had the statistical effect of increasing 
the aggregate capitaVasset ratio by  about 7 percent. 
'Ratio  of capital, reserves, general provisions, and subordinated debentures to total assets. Data exclude 
cooperative and mutual banks. This ratio is different from the official ratio of risk coverage where asscts 
are assigned different weights depending on the quality of each category of them. 
dRatio  of capital including published reserves to total assets. From December 1985, the Bundesbank data 
incorporate credit cooperatives (Deutsche Bundesbank, Mnnzhly Report). 
'Ratio  of reserves for possible loan losses, specified reserves, share capital, legal reserves plus surplus, and profits 
and losses for the term to total assets (Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Monthly). 
'Ratio of capital resources (share capital, reserves excluding current-year profits, general provisions, and 
eligible subordinated loans) to total payables. Eligible subordinated loans are subject to prior authorization 
by  the lnstitut Monetaire Luxembourgeois and may not exceed 50 percent of a bank's share capital and 
reserves. Data in the table are compiled on a nonconsolidated basis and as a weighted average of all banks 
(excluding foreign bank branches). An  arithmetic mean for 1988 would show a ratio of  19.2 percent. 
Inclusion of current-year profits in banks'  capital resources would result in a weighted average of 4.4 
percent for  1988. Provisions for country risks,  which are excluded from capital resources,  have been 
moderately increased in the last year. The 1988 level of provision represents five times the level of  1982. 
gRatio  of capital, disclosed free reserves, and subordinated loans to total assets. Eligible liabilities  of business 
members of the agricultural credit institutions  are not included  (De  Nederlandsche  Bank,  N.V., Annual Report). 301  International Coordination of Financial Policy 
hRatio  of capital plus published reserves, a part of hidden reserves, and certain subordinated loans to total 
assets (Swiss National Bank, Monthly Report). 
'Ratio of share capital and reserves, plus minority interests and loan capital, to total assets (Bank of England). 
'Ratio of capital and other funds (sterling and other currency liabilities)  to total assets (Bank  of England). Note 
that these figures include U.K. branches of foreign banks, which normally have little capital in the United 
Kingdom. 
kRatio  of total capital (including equity, subordinated debentures, and reserves for loan losses) to total assets. 
'Reporting banks are all banks that report their country exposure for publication in the Country Exposure 
Lending  Survey of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. 
Table 7.9  Equity Markets: Secondary Trading Values and Volumes,  1979- 1988 (in 
billions of U.S. dollars) 
International Equity Markets 
Total World 


















































-  2.9 
45.7 
46.8 
-  25.6 
Source: Salomon Brothers, International  Equity Flows- 1989 Edition 
"Index 1979 = 100. 
Notes 
1. In this paper I concentrate on central bank intervention to avoid systemic liquidity 
crises, but a mispriced deposit insurance scheme would present the same moral hazard 
problems. 
2. See Greenspan (1988). 
3. For a detailed description of developments in international financial markets, see 
4. See Folkerts-Landau and Mathieson (1988), Kane (1983), and Silber (1983). 
5. The antigambling statute in Illinois was superseded in  1974 to  allow for trading 
in  financial futures with cash settlement.  See Miller (1986). 
6. Standby letters of credit issued by the ten largest money center banks grew from 
7.5 percent to 11.5 percent of total assets during  1981-85.  Interest rate swaps grew 
from zero to 14 percent of total assets, on a national value, over the same period, while 
foreign exchange contracts rose to  105 percent of total assets by  1985. 
7. Under the Basle Agreement on risk-weighted capital standards, such off-balance 
sheet transactions are now treated as balance sheet items. 
Watson, Kincaid, and Folkerts-Landau (1987). 302  David Folkerts-Landau 
8. See Folkerts-Landau (1985). 
9. For a detailed discussion of the implications of these technological changes for 
financial markets, see Saunders and White (1986). 
10. See Report on  Netting  Schemes.  Basle,  Switzerland:  Bank  for International 
Settlements, 1989. 
11. A further motive for deregulating interest rate ceilings and restrictions on the 
investment choice of some financial intermediaries has been the need to finance fiscal 
deficits. A greater volume of government bonds outstanding acted as a stimulus to the 
development of  secondary markets for debt securities with market-determined yields 
and presented an investment asset alternative to bank liabilities. 
12. See Heller (1988) and Greenspan (1988). 
13. Another example of  an innovation made possible by deregulation are financial 
14. See Folkerts-Landau (1985). 
15. See Golembe (1988). 
16. See Schwartz (1988). 
17. The contingent  liability  incurred by  financial authorities  through  implicit  or 
explicit  guarantees  to  financial  intermediaries  should  be  added  to  expected  fiscal 
deficits. 
18. As described in section 7.3, the presence of guarantees covering the obligations 
of  financial intermediaries is the main reason for regulatory restrictions on financial 
activities. Hence a reduction in such restrictions should be accompanied by a reduction 
in guarantees. 
19. Since securities houses are  increasingly thought to be  protected  by  liquidity 
guarantees, this argument also applies here. 
20. See Folkerts-Landau (1985). 
21. In  this instance, widely diverging capital standards had offered a competitive 
advantage to banks from some jurisdictions, most notably Japan (table 7.8), and some 
national regulators were reluctant to raise capital standards for fear of putting their 
banks at a further competitive disadvantage. 
futures, the need for which increased with the spread of variable interest rates. 
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Comment  Francesco Papadia 
Just to make clear to the reader how much I agree with the paper, and thus 
maybe spare him or her further reading of this comment, I want to put my 
main, but minor, disagreement at the beginning. This has to do with the use 
Francesco Papadia is a director and head of the International Economy Section of  the Research 
Department of  the Banca d’Italia in Rome. 304  David Folkerts-Landau 
of  the term  “financial  policy”  for what I would rather call supervisory  and 
regulatory policy. Of course, language is a convention and the author is careful 
to spell what he means by financial policy. Yet conventions are not irrelevant 
and not little confusion would arise if one decided that yes means no, and no 
means yes. The case here is less extreme, but financial policy evokes financing 
decisions for a firm or a government, not the admittedly heterogeneous set of 
activities which are commonly referred  to as  supervision  and regulation  of 
financial markets. 
Having disposed of my main point of disagreement, I can now underline one 
of  the  merits  of  the  paper:  the  illustration  of  the  developments  which 
increasingly allow financial firms to arbitrage regulations and liquidity support 
from regulatory  authorities across geographical  boundaries  and sectors. The 
emphasis on this second aspect, that is, on the increasing ability of financial 
firms to shift business away from heavily regulated sectors, such as commercial 
banking, to less regulated ones is indeed an interesting feature of  the paper, 
complementing the more usual remarks on arbitrage across jurisdictions. Also 
the explanation of the phenomenon given in the paper is convincing, stressing 
the increased opportunities flowing from technological  advances, macroeco- 
nomic imbalances, and new financial products. 
The only criticism I have of this aspect of the paper is that Folkerts-Landau 
does not pay much attention to what is probably the most extreme example of 
new  opportunities for financial  firms to  arbitrage  regulations  and  liquidity 
protection,  namely the EEC single market to be achieved by  1992. The year 
1992 has become the code word for a complex, yet simple, set of events. The 
simplicity lies in the fact that an integrated market will be created out of twelve 
segmented ones. The complexity lies in the fact that to achieve this result, a 
formidable number of institutional and behavioral changes are required. 
As regards financial markets, a sizable chunk of  1992 will indeed occur in 
1990. The twelve EEC countries have in fact decided  that complete liberal- 
ization will take place by mid-1990, with provisional arrangements for Spain, 
Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. Complete liberalization means that all financial 
transactions will be allowed, including so-called monetary ones. Controls could 
be reimposed only by means of a safeguard clause for a maximum of six months. 
The application  to banks  and  other financial  institutions  of  the general 
principle of allowing competition across borders, through the establishment of 
a minimum of harmonization and mutual recognition, implies that they will be 
allowed  to  operate  in  all  member  states of  the  EEC  subject  to  the  core 
harmonized  provisions  while  complying with  the rules  of  their  country  of 
origin. Thus, in principle, in every state there could be banks complying with 
twelve different regulatory  and supervisory  systems and this of  course will 
affect  competition. Unless  customers are ultrarational  and  understand  that 
different regulations imply different degrees of protection, for which they are 
somehow willing to pay, the result will be exactly, and to a very high degree, 305  International Coordination of Financial Policy 
the one underlined in Folkerts-Landau’s paper, that is, competition in laxity by 
supervisory authorities. 
The main point of the paper is, in fact, that there is increasing competition 
between regulatory systems. Operators are increasingly able to “buy and sell” 
financial regulations, thus giving a specific example of a general phenomenon 
underlined a long time ago by  Richard  Cooper. This is putting pressure on 
regulators  who  see their  “market  share”  decrease  if  they  insist  on tight 
regulation; the net result is a general loosening of regulations.  The answer is 
increasing coordination of supervisory and regulatory policy. 
All this is very neat in theory and relevant in practice.  As often happens, 
however, it is not terribly neat in practice. Indeed, coordination of regulatory 
and supervisory policy can be either bad or good. The crucial difference is 
whether  the  regulations  are  economically  justified  or  not.  Schemes  like 
emergency  liquidity  and  deposit  guarantees,  for  instance,  could be  needed 
because of information asymmetries,  which make the confidence required to 
maintain banks in business potentially very volatile, or, as the author puts it, 
because ‘‘payments systems transmit disturbances from one bank to another, 
thus turning local financial disturbances  into systemic problems.’ ’ But such 
schemes induce banks to take extra risks, and therefore additional checks and 
regulations must control the quality of their assets. Alternatively, and some of 
the passages of the paper seem to support this view,  authorities  “bail out” 
banks and impose controls and regulations for some unclear and possibly not 
very good economic reasons. 
The policy  prescription  is  radically  different  depending  on  whether  the 
regulations and the underlying schemes for providing emergency liquidity or 
deposit guarantees do or do not have to make up for a market failure. If they 
do, coordination of regulatory policy is obviously good; if they do not, the 
welfare effect of coordination is uncertain. 
In  fact, in  the  former  case,  coordination  eliminates  an  avenue whereby 
financial institutions could increase the riskiness of their assets up to a point 
where the stabilization effect of liquidity protection or deposit guarantee would 
be completely offset. In the latter case, however, while the possibility to evade 
controls would clearly make any ‘‘bailing out activity” on the side of authorities 
more costly, it would also increase welfare by reducing economically unjustified 
restrictions. In addition, one would think that, in the long run, the very fact 
that bailing out activities were made more costly could make the authorities 
less prone to embark on them. In any event, it would certainly be a welfare- 
improving move to shun coordination while reducing regulations and ‘‘bailing 
out”  activities. 
The paper outlines the two possibilities but, reflecting the unfortunate fact 
that reality  is not as clear-cut as one would wish, Folkerts-Landau does not 
really succeed in discriminating between the two, although he does harness 
relevant material for the purpose.  This remains the task for further analysis. 306  David Folkerts-Landau 
A final sort of technical remark is that it cannot be literally true that there 
is “competition  for market shares by financial authorities.”  The main point of 
the paper can be restated by saying that the possibility to arbitrage regulations 
across  markets  and  sectors  has  transformed  regulatory  authorities  from 
monopolists to monopolistic competitors. These are likely to maximize profits, 
or revenue, not market share. To see that the two maximization activities can 
yield drastically different results, imagine that the monopolistic  firm applied 
a zero price and the regulatory authority applied zero control. They would thus 
maximize  market  share but  realize  zero revenue  and zero control, hardly  a 
desirable outcome. It is more reasonable that regulatory authorities maximize 
total control, which would be a function of market share and unitary control, 
that is, control per financial institution. This view is also more consistent with 
the empirical observation that supervisory authorities, while taking account of 
competition from other authorities, are surely not bringing their regulations to 
zero. Indeed, it appears that authorities from large countries, which are likely 
to be confronted with a steeper demand curve, because they are less exposed 
to competition  from other authorities, tend to apply stricter regulations  than 
those applied in small, and eventually  tiny, countries. 